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ABSTRACT
The comfortable thought is over in our psychical relation to Percy Shelley and
Sigmund Freud because the line of reasoning it invokes is chaotic, if only because trying
to define psyche and history leads to chaotic conclusions, especially at the beginning of
the twenty-first century. Shelley and Freud recognized this and were able to channel it
into their art, myth, fable, allegory. The events of their lives, their History, produces itself
from chaos (Freud writes across two World Wars, Shelley under the shadow of the
French Revolution, Jacobin massacres and Napoleonic wars), which means its producer
is chaotic, Divine Chaos, Miltonic Chaos, but chaos it still remains. There is no
systematic order to their thought except that systematic order escapes all Thought, true
thought, at least. Please bear this in mind when you read the confused pages that follow,
which seek to tether chaos to coherence. Above all, this is an attempt to separate the
wheat from chaff in Shelley and in Freud.
Percy Shelley’s psychological poetry speaks a language less heard than read; the opposite
holds true for Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. I argue that in order to hear Shelley and
read Freud, it is necessary to first discover and then impose a grammatical architecture already
present in their writings. Such mental scaffoldings occupy what Shelley calls Love, Freud, Eros.
Each conceptual term demonstrates within and without its boundaries the same radical rebellion
of thought: the sum of duty enjoined and buttressed by the artist’s mind must always ruin the
imaginary landscape, across and from which the mind imagines.
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Introduction
Go your way; behold, I send you out lambs among wolves.
—Luke 10:3
Our comfortable thought about Psyche and History is over. Our rested and
repeated notions of Percy Shelley, over. We no longer think of Shelley as Sun-Treader,
which Robert Browning called him. As regards Freud, the story is somewhat different in
that we have yet to find any comfort in his thought.
Percy Shelley and Sigmund Freud deserve and merit our ears and eyes; their
thought still speaks to us, and I understand why some could call them prophets; yet their
writings deserve much more than we are able to read right now. The title seer, maker or
vates is for the majority of people who hear it said absurd, ridiculous and puerile. So
when I use the word prophet, I mean the OED’s definition of it, a “Divinely inspired
person, and related senses” (emphasis mine). Most critics, literary, historical,
philosophical, psychological, scientific take what I have emphasized in the OED’s
definition of “prophet” and construe around it an argument or defense of the word, as if
we can no longer call poet’s prophets, prophets poets because we are beyond such cant.
However, I choose to let “Divinely Inspired Person” stand alone without any qualifiers or
semantic or semiotic challenges. I do this for two reasons: first, brevity; second, I once
read a major twentieth century author1 define it in a curious way. He reminds us that we
are only vertebrae, nothing more. But he qualified that statement with this: we are
vertebrae tipped with a divine spark.

1

Nabokov, Vladimir. Lectures on Literature, 6.
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The comfortable thought is over in our psychical relation to Percy Shelley and
Sigmund Freud because the line of reasoning it invokes is chaotic, if only because trying
to define psyche and history leads to chaotic conclusions, especially at the beginning of
the twenty-first century. Shelley and Freud recognized this and were able to channel it
into their art, myth, fable, allegory. The events of their lives, their History, produces itself
from chaos (Freud writes across two World Wars, Shelley under the shadow the French
Revolution, Jacobin massacres and Napoleonic wars), which means its producer is
chaotic, Divine Chaos, Miltonic Chaos, but chaos it still remains. There is no systematic
order to their thought except that systematic order escapes all Thought, true thought, at
least. Please bear this in mind when you read the confused pages that follow, which seek
to tether chaos to coherence. Above all, this is an attempt to separate the wheat from
chaff in Shelley and in Freud.
Percy Shelley’s psychological poetry speaks a language less heard than read; the opposite
holds true for Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. I argue that in order to hear Shelley and
read Freud, it is necessary to first discover and then impose a grammatical architecture already
present in their writings. Such mental scaffoldings occupy what Shelley calls Love, Freud, Eros.
Each conceptual term demonstrates within and without its boundaries the same radical rebellion
of thought: the sum of duty enjoined and buttressed by the artist’s mind must always ruin the
imaginary landscape, across and from which the mind imagines.
Shelley interprets “Love” as he does poetry and Poet: a psychical condition out of which
blooms—simultaneously—creation and destruction. Normally, an attempt is made to scavenge
Shelley’s truest construal of poetic aesthetics from the Defense of Poetry, something like poets
2

are the unacknowledged legislators of the world; but a more potent and revealing glimpse into
Shelley’s poetic project shows up in the preface to Prometheus Unbound: “Poets, not otherwise
than philosophers, painters, sculptors and musicians, are in one sense the creators and in another
the creations of their age. From this subjection the loftiest do not escape” (208; emphasis mine).
Shelley implicitly suggests he is a member of the “loftiest,” yet remembers to temper such elitism
with figural absolutism, subjection and slavery (mental and material), and also a psychological
declaration of subjection. Both paradigms would seem abhorrent to Shelley, yet Shelley
possesses the mental agility to not only hold them but also versify them at once. Furthermore,
Shelley’s desire to escape becoming a creation of his age might not be as energetic as the preface
leads us to believe. Actually, Prometheus Unbound can be read solely as a product of Shelley’s
contemporaneity, the historical and literary moment in which Shelley composed it. Reading the
poem this way, however, is reductive and misses the mark of Shelley’s aim, which is history and
psyche as both interdependent and separate, the former text and latter reader of text. In making
the distinction between creator and creation in the preface, Shelley acts the Platonic dualist, but
he is at once also echoing Aristotle through the idea that what we cannot escape is our desire to
subject order to stratification and materialism, groupings and quantifiers; in trying to make a slave
out of order, we become order’s slave. We see this happening in the first act to Prometheus, who
is unwilling to imagine, let alone declare another order to things. With this in mind, the preface to
Prometheus tells us one of its principle themes: order is perspectival; when you look at the world
differently and speak to it differently, the world will change in turn.
The poet, so Shelley would have us believe, is a slave to subject rather than object, a slave
period, whose master we shall see is Chaos. More than most British Romantics, Shelley
3

incorporates an allusory dance across the Greeks, Romans and Germans, Dante and Rousseau.
Like Coleridge, who borrows incessantly from a diverse array of source material, Shelley’s
eclectic erudition is always working against the idea of the One Mind that he writes about in
Defense of Poetry, against the Idealism to which critics often confine him. Yet what we could
name Shelley’s monistic tendencies, the Idealistic half of the title Skeptical Idealist, would better
serve Shelleyean scholarship if “manacled” substituted for “monistic.” Furthermore, that Shelley
digests the tradition of the ancients (Defense of Poetry is an available example) simply
demonstrates the impossibility of achieving such an ambitious goal as realizing in one poem or
many the One Mind, One Poem. Shelley’s language is always elastic and adaptable, in both
meaning and formal presentation, always in doubt about itself. As Marc Redfield tells us, this
doubt occurs as critical misreading in Shelley’s The Mask of Anarchy, but I see his insights
happening in Prometheus Unbound also:
The Mask is a dream that generates and destroys its dreamer both as a character
and as a source of authority; it collapses into the stutter of “these words”—these
words on the page that, as professional academics, we read again, again, again.2
(159)
Prometheus Unbound holds no claim to material reality, so calling it a dream is accurate, and it
will collapse if what we, as professional academics, persist in doing wrongly, which is reading it
wrongly. In the first act, Prometheus stutters again and again trying to recall “these words,” and
in the fourth, we as readers, stutter to recall the words of acts one, two and three. Redfield using
the word dream because dreams are always already in doubt because we can never remember
2

Redfield, Marc. The Politics of Aesthetics.
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them wholly; they are partial inscriptions on the psyche.
A similar skepticism pervades Freud’s writing, and rather than anticipating Freud’s
definition of Eros, which I contend is the brilliant casting of the mind’s multi-colored shadow in
struggle with itself against conscience and society, Shelley demonstrates it poetically in
Prometheus Unbound. In Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents, in which “Eros” grapples with
“Ananke” (Necessity) and “Thanatos” (Death drive) for control of self-control, Freud goes so far
as to exalt Love above all other attribute of the mind’s psychology, just as Shelley does. He says,
“[a]t the height of being in Love, the boundary between ego and object threatens to melt away,”
and he also contends that although Love is a normal mental entity, most pathological processes
rely on a false reading of the demarcation between self and society (13).
Freud’s seminal work on man in society tells the story of what happens when we try to
live independent of Fate, Chance and Destiny, when the wellspring of all happiness draws from
the ego-subject; in other words, he writes against Idealism. Largely a treatise on doctrinal
Religion, Civilization and its Discontents puts into play a disturbing notion: Civilization
possesses a single pathology—itself—which, of course, can also cure itself. Freud says that
happiness must always be an episodic phenomenon because the human species can only
experience pleasure and pain through contraries: “We are so made that we can derive intense
enjoyment only from a contrast and very little from a state of things” (25-6). And like Shelley,
Freud understands the evolutionary progress of these civil contrasts (and contracts) carried
forward within the psychical and individual development of the individual mind, which always
posits, and only sometimes chooses to recall through memory the attributes of natural and
civilized man, as History. I will show how Prometheus Unbound proleptically performs Freud’s
5

interpretation of Self (ego, id, super-ego) up until its last line, “This is alone Life, Joy, Empire
and Victory,” where it collapses in one final rebellion of exile and ecstasy (IV.578).
I mentioned above that in order to hear Shelley and read Freud, we first must discover and
then impose a grammatical architecture already present in their thought and words. What we
discover is presence is already not a possible condition for the intellect as soon as we recognize
its pastness. I will adopt Freud’s name for this psychical entity, Eternal City, which stands
already complete in Prometheus Unbound; in fact, I make the claim that the Eternal Mind is what
Prometheus establishes, itself as poem. Therefore, when reading Shelley, we lay among the ruins,
and while listening to Freud, among future excavations; finally, however, the conditions which
dissociate the two postures, violently consume each other; as readers of Shelley and Freud, we
bear witness to this almost ineffable sublime force, swerve them into our own contemporary, and
therefore superannuated moment.
In Civilization and its Discontents, Freud chooses ancient and modern Rome as his
analogue to what he describes as “preservation in the sphere of the mind,” or how “memorytraces” are drawn and annihilated in both individual and social realms (16). By this, he means
simply that we do not understand how individuals make memories, sustain them or recall them
intentionally or unintentionally. These psychological processes, in this instance, at least, herald
an astonishing and self-replicating claim to the philosophy of History, one in which Shelley’s
poetry sometimes transcends and is defeated. I examine this more closely in chapter two of this
thesis, but for now it is important to know what Freud actually says: “If we want to represent
historical sequence in spatial terms we can only do it by juxtaposition in space: the same space
cannot have two different contents” (19). I quote Shelley to illustrate the versification of this
6

thought, and show how Freud is partly correct in saying we are far from “mastering the
characteristics of mental life by representing them in pictorial terms” (19). The following lines are
Shelley’s, and occur in the most desperate passage of Prometheus Unbound:
Yet pause, and plunge
Into Eternity, where recorded time,
Even all that we imagine, age on age,
Seems but a point, and the reluctant mind
Flags wearily in its unending flight
Till it sink, dizzy, blind, lost, shelterless;
Perchance it has not numbered the slow years
Which thou [Prometheus] must spend in torture, unreprieved. (I.17-23)
Mercury essentially explains to Prometheus in this passage why Freud contends we cannot color
our vision long enough to see at once both the “scanty remains” of Republican Rome and the
“great metropolis that has grown up in the last few centuries since the Renaissance” (19). Shelley
recurs this idea, which center’s on a “point,” yet rather than realizing it, he submits to its
dizzying power and blindness, which in the remainder of Prometheus Unbound is adapted
towards pluralistic language and thought. As readers, the passage encourages us to follow its line
of reasoning also and “pause” and “plunge” into each passage, suspend it and look at it from all
available angles. The rewards for this kind of reading are great, and are paralleled in Prometheus’s
recollection of his curse.
In the two chapters which follow, I argue that History, the story of our social progress
and evolution as a social species, and history, the story of our individual psychological
7

development, our past, present and future are conditioned by the Psyche, by what we are not,
and, paradoxically, what we once were and will become again. As regards the subject of this
thesis, Shelley’s poetry and Freud’s prose, my methodology is tracing within Shelley the
psychomachia, or struggle of the soul, that becomes so literal in Freud, and vise versa. Our past
and future is always a struggle within the soul because we think we know where it abides, in the
starry heavens above, and where it comes, from the moral duty within.3 Poetry and History are
bondservants to the Psyche. The debt pays in full, more often than not.

3

This is a rough borrowing of Kant’s epitaphal inscription on his tombstone.
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Chapter One
Alas! I wonder at, yet pity thee.
—Mercury (PU I.428)

Prometheus Unbound enlists the linguistic and cultural inhibitions that authority imposes
on and requires from the individual. My reading takes as its point of departure an analysis of the
poem at its archetypal, psycho-cultural level, finding in Shelley’s poem through Freud an
expression of the sustained anxiety “of the superior power of Fate” (20). Arriving at Shelley’s
four-act lyrical drama by way of Freudian paradigms would seem arbitrary if this is all I wished
to do; but I argue that in reading Freud we can hear Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound—Shelley
becomes present in Freud’s theses. My goal from reading Shelley’s longest and most sustained
composition, which is also his most complexly arranged, is double-minded: 1) to demystify the
struggle staged in Prometheus of the individual and authoritative mind; and 2) to grasp the
meaning, and the force and value drawn from this meaning, of Shelley’s decision to render
Prometheus and Jupiter their imaginary poetic embodiments. My goal from reading Freud is
similarly divided: 1) to demonstrate how Prometheus affects a sense of the uncanny through
Shelleyean Love; and 2) to show the value of directing Shelley’s philosophical poetics toward
Freud’s.4 What I see happening in the writings of Shelley and Freud is a willing admittance of the
limitations of the brokering power of the Psyche, which is represented at its highest level in
Shelley by Love and in Freud by Eros.
4

Freud the modern Philosopher is to my understanding the mode of discourse that best
delivers his theoretical project, and does not play into the double bind of proceeding from
the proposition that Freud is the “Father of Psycho-analytic interpretation,” wherein we
as readers become another iteration of infantile helplessness, and our turn back to Freud,
a substitutive satisfaction of paternal protection.
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Each author exploits the limitations of the “affective nucleus” of their thought in order to
yield a gain. If we are to believe Freud when he tells us that “we are so made that we can derive
intense enjoyment only from a contrast and very little from a state of things,” then we are
pressed to consider the knowledge of this contrast, its positive and negative side (25-6). Because
in Prometheus Shelley tries to record the psychological revolutions of a model mind inhabiting a
model civilized man, then the theories we attach to Freudian psychoanalysis offer the surest
interruption to Shelley’s thought; Freud de-familiarizes Shelley, turns Prometheus Unbound into
an uncanny poem. Similarly, the logical converse of “Freudianizing” Shelley admits a more poetic
reading of Freud. Those moments while reading Freud in which disappear the psychoanalytic
case histories of patients in pursuance of a greater story reproduce and revalue Freud as inheritor
of a much more comprehensive record of philosophical inquiry than the once novel rubric,
psychoanalytic interpretation. Shelley familiarizes Freud for us, turning our evolving notions of
“literary history” and cultural criticism into a collective compulsion to repeat, and then refute or
revalue, the meaning of Freud’s claims. In effect, the existence of Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound
demonstrates Freud’s persistent unintentional return; and in its windows we can see ourselves as
onlookers, inhibited by the domestic comfort of the familiar. The question admits its answer only
in reading Shelley’s best poem, Prometheus Unbound.
Because the works of Sigmund Freud are canonized texts in a similar sense to Percy
Shelley’s, for each press their influence beyond the discourse they occasion as Modern and
Romantic, each author distributes his most important claims according to a central theme:
Freudian Eros and Shelleyean Love. The centrality of these guiding principles tasks itself the aim
of soliciting and subverting the height and reach of the existential and cultural symptoms that
10

have determined Western philosophy and poetics since at least the French Revolution. “Poets,”
Shelley tells us in the preface to Prometheus Unbound in a passage I quoted above in the
Introduction, “not otherwise than philosophers, painters, sculptors and musicians, are in one
sense the creators and in another the creations of their age” (208). Shelley’s poem, which tells its
story along lines similar to what Freud calls the exposure myth of Moses, rigorously interrogates
the truth of this claim, and, finally, operates against it. Drawing out from the poem two
antagonistic ideas, one begins to breathe its air (or heir, so to speak): the misted clarity of Love as
precondition for Shelley’s cultural ideals and the bitterant knowledge that this Love recognizes
and brings about. The point of intersection between them represents the principle of difference
the poem aims at: a restructuring of history and psyche, a “victory” of love, obtained at the
psychological and political level. Freud’s contribution to this belated victory through the
economics of the libido5 fixes itself firmly to our notions of what is scientific and philosophical
inquiry, questioning the methodologies that produce the possibility for such. We can draw from
this impact, which is the impact of fundamental shifts in human thinking and behavior, an
analogue to the French Revolution and the moment of literary history that counterpoints it,
Romanticism.
I want to call attention to one such shift in human thinking and behavior: the clash and
pressure that occurs when writing about Shelley and Freud. It has its roots in two very different
lines of reasoning: on the one hand, the question of what it means to be traditional or progressive,

5

Freud makes the distinction between erotic and procreant love. The term “economics”
employs exchange values for each. One must pay dearly to the other in satisfying the
demands of the pleasure-seeking ego.
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and who, whether a poet like Shelley, or psychical theorist like Freud, best equips his audience
with the knowledge to interpret their terms and our interpretive terms for them. On the other
hand, and independent of all speculative spheres, whether traditional or modern, scientific or
philosophical, the question of what is being tested when we say “science,” or “philosophy,”
“history” or “psychological,” “traditional” or “modern.” What we discover is two vastly
different ways of understanding the mental life of human existence: the one seeks a reconciliation
of consistently diverging pieces into a whole, the other a whole that justifies itself in consistently
diverging pieces. I call this binary opposition history versus psyche. To call this situation a
clash of two “isms,” or some pressurized aneurism waiting to puncture into the remote sphere of
the mind, or great thinkers enjoined by the very thing all great thinkers wish to conquer and
reduce, the temporal, is to suggest somehow that the projects of Shelley and Freud demonstrate
its collision. This is not the case; in fact, one could say that my choice to collide these two
perspectives from the bi-polarity of Shelley’s thought to Freud’s only bears on the tendency to
keep appointments we don’t remember making. However, because I see a clash of historical and
psychological notions of discourse happening between the whole and the many pieces that make
it up, drawing out its presence in Shelley and Freud seems a good enough occasion to argue that
our notion of History is nothing other than a temporary dominance of one mental process over
another.
Shelley’s decision to leave England for a nation that better conformed to his radical and
revolutionary wishes parallels a mental need to free himself from the temporal demands of chance
and necessity; he substitutes an undesirable relationship between the individual and his
civilization with a poetic one. Prometheus Unbound records this substitution, but what merits
12

attention to Shelley’s achievement and affects our own departure toward the twenty-first
century is that this substitution turns out to be a re-duplication. He wishes both himself and
civilization to be “[f]rom custom’s evil taint exempt and pure” (PU III.iv.155). Both the weight
and waiting of example and experience reveal in Shelley an aesthetics that wishes to be freed from
custom, a wish born out of a need to live beyond history and politics. I think this explains the
powerful monistic tendency in Shelley, as if each distinct and individuated poem prolongs the
mind’s exposure to the One poem; this prolongation which the writing of poetry affords also
serves as protection from the mind’s complete absorption, and therefore annihilation, into the
One poem. The Defense of Poetry is just this: a simultaneous prolongation and delay of the
evolutionary development of what Shelley self-consciously calls participation in the “eternal, the
infinite and the one” (513). In its pursuit, he must draw from a source of great anxiety and
unhappiness; he must invoke and sanction the very antithesis of “this indestructible order”
Poetry, Chaos. And not surprisingly, the embodiment of chaos for Shelley discovers itself in
Prometheus in a figure of much disputed entity in the poem: Demogorgon. Because of the
impossibility of this ideal, gratifying within poetic discourse a wish that can only always be a
reality at the end of poetic discourse, the desire and attempt to both recover and defend against
the demands of this ideal gives shape to the main conflict of the poem, which is madness. This
dramatic tension plays itself out in the reader’s mind, which mirrors it back as a choice that
values one attempt to reconcile and interpret the conflict, love and all that threatens and is
opposed to it, over another.
Prometheus Unbound is a poem conceived and composed in exile. From fall 1818 to
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winter 1819, Shelley wrote Prometheus in Italy.6 Several themes play this exile out in the poem,
each tethered to the idea of the Family Romance. However, one consequence of exile presses
itself more consistently throughout the poem than any other: repudiation. This repudiation takes
on several guises, the most refined of which is artistic creation. One model of interpretation, then,
for Prometheus Unbound is drawn forth from Shelley’s need to recreate a world unthreatened by
cultural demands while exiled. Adherence to custom, politics and history drive these demands.
Turning away from them toward oneself shores the line of demarcation between the pleasure
seeking ego and external world that threatens its access to pleasure.
Freud speaks of the hermit’s method of repudiation against failed attempts to find
happiness in society, who performs the role of exile:
One can try and re-create the world, to build up in its stead another world
in which its most unbearable features are eliminated and replaced by others
that are in conformity with one’s own wishes. (Civilization and its
Discontents 31)
That the figure Prometheus is in possession of a great power at the poem’s beginning is
without question. The story tells us that Jupiter’s sphere of influence ends where Prometheus’s
psychological constitution begins; Prometheus has given Jupiter control of the Earth and cosmos,
but not of himself. He is barred, through the exercise of his great will, from satisfying vital
physical needs. In his great contempt for Jupiter, the Father and Patriarch of this poem, he
sacrifices to a single reproach in the form of a curse the physical liberty of not only himself but

6

Donald H. Reiman and Neil Fraistat, eds. Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, 202.
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also the human race; Prometheus re-creates the world by repudiating it. This repudiation, a denial
of the Father, is the first stage, a necessary one, in the evolution of unbinding Prometheus, and
also the primitive and infantile in human thought. One senses a stubborn child reproaching the
unreasonable demands of an overbearing Father in the opening speech of the drama. And, like a
stubborn and frustrated child, Prometheus sees his present condition as a permanent one: “Ah
me, alas, pain, pain ever, forever!” (I.22). Of course, Shelley did not share this bleak view of
things, who maintained all creative gestures of mankind, aesthetic, political or scientific or
otherwise, constitute and reflect the eternal poem from which all such gestures derive.7 One could
even speculate the poem itself is the attempted suicide of this “pain ever, forever.”
Prometheus Unbound begins by trying to seize hold of a great loss. Prometheus tries to
remember what he said before the poem, the words that now bind him. The goal of this
recollection is to depose Jupiter, and the physical force that legitimizes his rule. As the action of
the poem demonstrates, this authority and the fear that attaches to it resist all external threats. In
order to remove Jupiter’s supremacy over the phenomenal world, which constitutes both the
source from which authority claims power and the fear of punishment that authority
incorporates into individuals, Prometheus turns away from physical defenses toward mental
ones. At play is an interrogation into the origin of the mental slavery in which we first see
Prometheus. Reading the conflict between Prometheus and Jupiter at the beginning of the play as
an expression and occasion for the recreation of a world undisturbed by history and the
implacability of custom is just one model of interpretation, and a very literal one. The infantile
need for a father’s protection is a manifestation of a much deeper feeling pursued by the ego. The
7

Defense of Poetry. 1821.
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poem moves toward this deeper feeling, and tries repeatedly to articulate it. The fourth act is
largely devoted to exalting this sense and feeling into a historical ideal driven by a political
program of love. The first act, in sharp contrast, works as both a lament to this singular and
unitary state of consciousness and, at the same time, a sanguinary plea for a future where the
inner and outer life of mankind is not itself already divided into separate aims. “[O]riginally the
ego includes everything,” Freud tells us, “later it separates off an external world from itself”
(Civilization and its Discontents 15).
If a mind hopes to successfully negotiate both the demands and advances of culture, there
must be a clear and stable delineation between experience and its interpretation, individual and
society. Inevitably, however, the contest of Markers who dispute the authenticity and legitimacy
of governing powers always threatens the rational of the mark; it therefore fails to remove the
original, but always present, longing for the union of experience and its interpretation, individual
and society. If individuals will achieve happiness in society, they must both submit to its laws
and participate in the customs and values that sustain its history. The appointment that Shelley
makes with culture in Prometheus Unbound rests on the assumption that ego interests can be
satisfied outside of the ego, but Shelley’s poem keeps telling us this is not the case. If it were,
then Prometheus need not pay attention to Jupiter’s tyranny, his forgotten curse that sustains it,
the new world visible beyond the horizon of Demogorgon’s deed. Prometheus, after all, tells
Jupiter’s phantasm that “Thou art Omnipotent. / O’er all things but thyself I gave thee power, /
And my own will” (I.272-3). Subject to horrific physical punishment, Prometheus nevertheless
claims a liberty inaccessible to Jupiter.
If Love is nearer the province of will than force, then why does Shelley take the poem
16

beyond the first act?; why the political revolution?; why the combat with history, custom,
everything social? Because Shelley writes in the preface, we are all “in one sense the creators and
in another the creations of [our] age”; because of conscience, quite simply, that element within
mental life which most resembles the extraneous world without (208). Maybe it is not what
Prometheus Unbound keeps telling us but what we, as critical readers, keep telling it that fails to
arrive at its destination and renders the reading experience unreadable.
The competing interests of human desire and the process of human development as a
mass that seeks to check that desire, produces a discord against which ego interests retreat as
civilization presses them further inward, a civilization that at the very same time promises to
harmonize this discord. Civilization plays off the originary and absolute harmony experienced by
the ego when it included everything. Because the memory of this perfect pleasure, as Freud
notes, does not altogether vanish from the mind as the reality principle presses upon it, but both
anticipates its recovery and fixates on its absence, therefore ruining the quality that governs its
perfection, its memory operates like history. History is the name we give to perpetual discord,
and Culture, our need to harmonize it. The ruins of memory, of which history comprises, Shelley
anticipates and wishes to bring into the present fury of pure being, eliminate, through the
execution of Prometheus Unbound. It comprehends the preface’s declaration of men as creators
and creations, expressing itself as a need to escape this “lofty subjection,” history, which, in the
poem, is itself already historical (208). Shelley does not disguise or complicate his reasons for
desiring unhistory, but clearly sets them forth in three prose pieces, “On Love,” “On Life,” and
Defense of Poetry.
A lot is said and implied in the opening sentence of “On Love”: “What is Love?—Ask
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him who lives what is life; ask him who adores what is God” (503). Shelley chooses to
understand Love, an idea we attach to a very powerful emotion, as signifying a much more
profound and procreant feeling, which brings with it the possibility of emotional experience. He
also suggests that Love is somehow different from life and God. Shelley does not ask someone
who lives, as “him who lives,” or adores, as “him who adores,” love to define it because Love,
according to Shelley, provides the possibility of answering all questions if Love can conform to
the pragmatic applications of society, or if such applications are willing to conform to Love’s
ideals. Not only does Prometheus Unbound resist this possibility up until its last word,
“Victory,”8 but also Shelley’s prose language inadvertently precludes it. Shelley endeavors to
settle the debt he owes to Love for its gift; in exchange for which Shelley gives up, quits his claim
to desire, ego-interests. But what provides the rational for such loss? For Shelley, Love construes
itself as “discovery of [an] antitype” (504). In “On Love,” Shelley calls this antitype “a
miniature as it were of our entire self […] the ideal prototype of every thing excellent or lovely
that we are capable of conceiving as belonging to the nature of man” (504). From this definition of
antitype we can begin to talk about Otherness in Prometheus Unbound, alterity, what Freud calls
the “uncanny,” an encounter with something or someone who, unfamiliar to the ego, surprises
and provokes within it a powerful sense of estrangement. However, the sense of estrangement is

8

The poem concludes with this passage, delivered by Demogorgon: “Neither to change
nor falter nor repent: / This, like thy glory, Titan! Is to be / Good, great and joyous,
beautiful and free; / This is alone Life, Joy, Empire and Victory.” One wonders what
Shelley was about giving Chaos the final words. Whether a careless concluding utterance,
or the decision of a poet who stands in awe of what he has composed, and realizing the
debt he owes to Thanatos, the Freudian Death drive, which is itself a slave to Ananke,
Necessity, or, more appropriately, I think, Chaos, Shelley concedes defeat and redeems
us by betraying us to “eternity,” the mental concept Demogorgon offers as his name.
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not so much genuine and literal as latent, since the uncanny experience situates itself in familiars,
in things that we understand as the same to ourselves. The someone or something else of the
uncanny is almost always another way of looking at ourselves, our things.
Derrida suggests that what we mean by Other is another way of looking at Self. And his
comments originate in Freud:
[…] just as psychoanalysis aims to teach us that, beside the Id and the Superego,
there is an Ego or a Me, in the same way psychoanalysis as the psychic structure
of a collective identity is composed of instances that can be called Id, Superego,
and Ego. Far from setting us adrift in a vague analogism, the figure of this relation
will tell us more about the terms of their analogical relation than any simple
internal inspection of their content.9 (136)
If the ideas and terms we use to understand the psyche lead us to a “collective identity” of the
Unconscious, and also to “instances” of it, then it seems to suggest that history is always an
uncanny structure insofar as it is always heterogeneous and collective. In this view, there is never
a We of history, only a Me, and if the randomness of chance dictates that “I” did not get to
experience this or that instance of it firsthand, then the Me of the psyche has no other choice but
to textualize and internalize it into the psyche, reading it into a real experience, so to speak.
Everything we never experience but know about becomes historicized in this way; it becomes
uncanny because of its familiarity, but it is familiar to us not because we experienced it in its
present moment, or instance, but because we forget to historicize it as a familiar process of the
psyche. Making of Prometheus Unbound an analogy between a psyche that forgets what was
9

Derrida, Jacques. Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume I.
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once known to an instance once experienced explains the complicated structure of the poem.
Shelley recalls more than Prometheus’s curse to liberate him, but also his Id and Superego, his
history.
However, before I closely read passages in the poem that stage this encounter with the
uncanny, showing how Freud’s 1919 eponymous essay on the subject carries the poem’s
discourse into futurity, I must make mention of Freud’s superego, which Shelley’s “antitype”
anticipates. Thomas Weiskel, in The Romantic Sublime, draws the analogy from what he
identifies Shelley’s “fear of identity” with Freud’s superego (148). He says, “[i]dentity is an
inverse function of desire, a secondary precipitate which coalesces as narcissistic desire fails or is
betrayed”10 (148). Because Love implicates identity in its failure to discover its own perfected
version of itself, Love duplicates Law—at this moment, and during its iterations, Shelley’s
rhetoric extinguishes the meaning it repeatedly gestures toward. The process reproduces itself in
Prometheus Unbound when, in act three, Demogorgon descends to his cave with Jupiter his
prisoner, as Prometheus is physically Jupiter’s in act one. Weiskel mentions that Shelley’s
poetry “move[s] into dialogue with […] a nonerotic ideal, a kind of superego,” a description that
ornaments Shelley’s “ideal prototype” with political impact and historical significance, since the
superego emerges in response to civilization’s effort to control individual aggression. Freud
compares the superego to conscience, a mental category that, like authority, always works to
subdue; in fact, I read the superego as external Law’s proxy in Law’s aspiration to become a fixed
premise of human action, subject to the needs of the public sphere. Weiskel’s “nonerotic ideal”
means one realized in death, working against Eros, and for which civilization well prepares
10
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individuals because, unlike the ego, as Freud notes, civilization can evolve and progress without
paying attention to happiness.
Whether Shelley makes the case for his antitype originating inside or outside the self is
unclear. If Love is “discovery of antitype,” then which discovery we call our own ever occurs
outside of the mind’s interpretive reach? Shelley’s antitype, it seems, because the discovery
reveals and names what was already always there, the “ideal prototype.” But the introduction of
another, whose mental life we can never really be sure of but whose existence we nonetheless
require to satisfy the social demands of human life, outside a Shellyean discourse on Love,
deteriorates into a reminder that everything “belonging to the nature of man” is not owned by
man. Simple knowledge of the discrepancy, conversing with others about the mysteries of
philosophy and science, Society, generally, brings Shelley no closer to the fulfillment of his wish;
instead, the opposite occurs, and when he tries to unburden his soul to another, he finds his
“language misunderstood like one in a distant and savage land” (503). We find a correlative with
the geographic and psychological compositions of Prometheus Unbound in the use of “distant”
and “savage.” The economics of exile dictates a simultaneous turning away from one culture and
turning toward another, which calls for a reshaping of it by the ego in satisfying the demands
made in the name of culture. Shelley’s poem is an expression of this need to create an
autonomous standard of measurement for what he calls in the preface “beautiful idealisms of
moral excellence” (209). The misunderstood language to which he refers in “On Love” is the
enigmatic form and composition, the wrought theatrical aestheticism of the lyrical drama,
Prometheus Unbound. If the poem arrives at the destination to which its preface aims, then the
invocation of a “beautiful idealism of moral excellence” becomes an elite icon of worship for its
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aspirants, yet for the majority of mankind whose vision the poem seeks to expand, a
misunderstood language, distant and uncontrollable.
I argue for Shelley’s ingenuousness in the preface, but hope to explain one of its principle
inconsistencies. I mean that Shelley, regardless the degree of self-consciousness, also and at the
same time he exalts “beautiful idealisms of moral excellence” in the poem’s preface, directly
threatens both their potency and potentialization. Something remains in excess at the end of the
poem, inerasable. This overflow and undesired extraneous part of the poem is history, the past,
which presses on the presence of the autonomous poem and the poet’s unconscious impressions,
both internal and external, which produced it. The fourth act of the poem can be read as attempt
to escape the dialectic of history and events. Shelley reaches beyond the triad of thesis, antithesis
and synthesis in search of excess, and the result is at times unreadable. But though the fourth act
might be unreadable in terms of the three acts that precede it, this is precisely the point. Excess
has no claim to precedence or eventual realization to future. The emotion that attaches itself to
the demands of excess is terror. The poem’s failure to mimetically represent in both form and
strength the mind’s first vision of it creates this terror and is the expression of it. This terror
carries forward the memory of the original vision of the poem into the present; without it, the
creative source of the poet dies, and so we can say that terror divides one half of Shelley’s
procreant urge; the other half is Love. Both coexist alongside each other in the mind, legitimized
in the difference between Prometheus Unbound and Shelley’s original vision of it. Excess of love,
like the excess we name “history,” unburdens itself in the aesthetic object, but it must battle
against being historicized, literally ruined by its contrary. In the Defense of Poetry, Shelley
universalizes this potential for love, which, as we shall see in Prometheus Unbound, becomes the
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excess that marks its origin:
Every man, in the infancy of art, observes an order which approximates
more or less closely to that from which this highest delight results: but the
diversity is not sufficiently marked, as that its gradations should be
sensible, except in those instances where the predominance of this faculty
of approximation to the beautiful (for so we may be permitted to name the
relation between this highest pleasure and its cause) is very great. Those in
whom it exists in excess are poets, in the most universal sense of the word
[.] (512)
This passage demands close attention because its meaning hinges, like Prometheus
Unbound, on Love’s transformation into a mental faculty while orbiting a remote enough distance
from the ego, as superego, to satisfy the powerful need for a singular ideal. Love for both Shelley
and Freud plays a god-like role in this process. Love, as they understand it, is anterior to all good
action, inhibited or uninhibited, and to all bad action gradations of its absence. In each writer, the
idea of love offers a compelling choice for how to account for the persistence of a lost condition
of wholeness. Memory carries the remains of private experience, that which we call past, and
writing public experience, what we call history. Love in Prometheus Unbound is the reason this
memory of perfect sense and feeling remains, and determines the natural and civic qualities of
these remains. But in acts three and four, particularly, as Prometheus “unbinds,” so to speak,
Love takes on an entirely different quality than in act one and two. The poem helps show us the
cost of Love. Beauty is now the object and subject of approximation, since he who loves is
necessarily beautiful. The poet purchases “this highest pleasure”—approximation to the
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beautiful—from literally loving beauty in exchange for bearing it “in excess.” Distributed across
the best minds of a generation, like a powerful sensory organ present in “poets,” according to
Shelley, and no one else, this excess drives cultural change because it departs from culture.
This departure threatens the logic of the established order in three ways. First, instead of
trying to destroy customs, and the values and events on which they rest, the excess seeks to
reinterpret them according to an “approximation to the beautiful.” So this first method of attack
is both historical, in that it “legislates” another event, and ahistorical, in that it seeks to escape its
own ruin as a legislated product bound to political history. Secondly, because Shelley’s use of
excess universalizes the “poet” in whom it exists, who can then “legislate” the world, it
complicates the boundary line between individual ego interests and those of society, and
therefore deligitimizes both extraneous authority and the signature “poet.” And finally, Love
bridges this excess to imagination and brings it forth into the social community (535).
The influence of Shelleyan excess in moving culture forward into futurity and arriving at
its meeting with history ready to repudiate and therefore historicize it, determines the action of
Prometheus Unbound and accounts for the inadequate distribution of its impact across literary
history. One could understand the direction of this departure as always turning in relation to
reason and imagination, and what these ideas gain for Shelley’s poetic discourse. Again, this
contest stages itself in a confrontation between Demogorgon and Jupiter, but to first identify the
process of its development in the Defense extends the reach of Shelley’s thoughts on poetry and
culture.11 In the first act, a fury says, “In each human heart, terror survives / The ravin it has

11

Shelley puts into play three different concepts in the Defense that name, but do not
necessarily determine the reality of Prometheus, Jupiter and Demogorgon: imagination,
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gorged,” two lines that demand rigorous and sensitive reading (618-20). The pun on “ravin” is
more important than it at first appears. One way to read ravin is “plunder, booty, spoils; that
which is taken or seized.”12 Here terror becomes a product of ravin, the psychological remnants
of a thing expressed in an emotion. If we read ravin as an act of “rapine or robbery; a plundering,
a pillaging,” then ravin becomes an event, and terror its interpretation.13 This would suggest that
terror is a motivating force in the carrying out of ravin, even always anterior to it. The paranoia
and morbidity that clouds Jupiter’s reign in the poem converges to a point of terror, and force
always follows; in fact, force impregnates the “terrorist” with a built-in warrant for its
application because physical force will always only terrorize those who wield it, or at least
Prometheus Unbound suggests. There is only one physical act of terror in the whole poem:
Demogorgon’s carefully structured and measured ascent to Jupiter, Jupiter’s evacuation of
power, symbol and control, and Demogorgon’s equally structured and measured descent back to
his throne in the deep. Prometheus, though the subject of physical torture for three thousand
years, avoids the mental disturbance of Jupiter. Prometheus comes close to despair, but never
terror.
Reading ravin as an event, and terror as the interpretation of it, the knowledge left over
from the event’s happening, suggests Shelley understands that the price of history is terror, since
reason, utility. By studying the interplay between reason, imagination and utility, one
maps out the psychological structure of Prometheus Unbound and the language that
charts its limits. Shelleyean Love names Asia, but operates throughout the whole poem,
its presence or absence consistently identified.
Poets, then, in Shelley’s view, cannot choose to vacate the public sphere, since their
existence legitimizes it.
12
13
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history seeks to record the discord and conflict between political subject and State (the ego and
everything extraneous to it). This marks a critical distinction between history and poetry. For
Shelley, poetry is the “record of the best and happiest moments of the happiest and best minds”
(532). This definition clearly anticipates the aim of the pleasure principle’s program, happiness,
and would seem to oppose the ruin that historicity consolidates.
Shelley’s 1816 lyric, Mont Blanc, offers another reading of the lines, “In each human
heart, terror survives / The ravin it has gorged.” In this poem, one begins to see how the pattern
of Shelley’s thought pulls external reality downward toward the region that Demogorgon will
inhabit in Prometheus. The Thou of Mont Blanc, also the mountain Mont Blanc is not Europe’s
highest peak but “ravine”: “Thus Thou, Ravine of Arve—dark, deep Ravine” (12).14 Fifteen lines
below in the second of five stanzaic breaks, the speaker says:
the strange sleep
Which when the voices of the desart fail
Wraps all in its own deep eternity. 15 (27-9)
The “strange sleep” is not death, but something like a living death, a vampyric veil that so
subtly insulates a feeling of meaning from the “swaddling clothes” of Luke and reorders it into a
“deep eternity.” If we read ravin as a “deep narrow gorge or cleft,” then we meet Freud at the
place where he metaphorizes depth as conscience, the vast interiority to which the ego descends
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No doubt the debt this poem owes to Coleridge’s Kubla Khan has been exhausted, but
whereas Coleridge builds from his imagination a pleasure dome, the developmental
process utilized in Mont Blanc proceeds from its ruins, a mental conceit that seems to
attribute imagination, perhaps ironically, to Natural entities outside its compass.
15
Read Yeats “The Second Coming.” Yeats’s Poetry, Drama, and Prose, 76.
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when pressed by society.16 Although reading the superego into ravin might seem arbitrary, I
think it is an accurate vocabulary in which to begin, since I will show how ravin essentially
consumes itself. This reading legitimizes many of the psychological assumptions of this thesis,
and makes full use of a brief passage from the Defense in which Shelley reveals in basic terms the
nature of his thought and poetry: “Poetry, and the principle of Self, of which money is the
visible incarnation, are the God and the Mammon of the world” (531).
Shelley’s placement of caesura, which leaves hanging for the reader “terror survives,” and
his use of enjambment, which drives the sentence toward “gorged,” reflects the rhetorical and
thematic impact of both lines and, in at least one respect, Prometheus Unbound: in Jupiter’s
world, Mammon’s, individuals cannibalize themselves in pursuit of “the principle of Self.” The
ravin, or ravine, exists to be sated, “gorged.” Love for Shelley lays claim to a certain individual
limitlessness, which poetry always seeks to outline, trace and define in order to match it, equal
its source. In a similar way, the principle of Self lays claim to an analogous limitlessness, a depth
whose operations mirror Freud’s id and whose appearance terrorizes both the individual in whom
it exists and the society at which it directs contempt. Shelley calls its visible incarnation in the
world “money,” from which we conclude the principle of Self is economic materialism, and the
relationship between Materialism and Individual is ownership. Jupiter owns one face of human
existence, things. The apparatus of this ownership is Law, and its force comes in the service of
things; Jupiter’s Law protects property. Because Jupiter understands Prometheus as a piece of
property only, a slave, he cannot access the other face of existence, Poetry, as Shelley calls it in
the Defense, but when Shelley mentions Prometheus’s tremendous will in the poem, he is talking
16
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about the same idea of liberty.
The distinction between Jupiter as master and Prometheus as slave complicates itself in
what can be construed as Jupiter’s sincere concern for Prometheus as property, albeit property
too expensive to own. This is to say that in one respect Jupiter’s interest, like Prometheus’s,
best serve them by canceling terror’s appointment with ravin: quite simply, terror must not gorge
ravin. If the insatiate desires that comprise Shelley’s “principle of Self” terrorize the human heart
with hate, avarice and violence, then what vanishes is hope. What rouses Prometheus from
inaction, and occasions the repudiation of his curse is exactly this: civilization, as Shelley knows
it during the composition of Prometheus, distributes its institutions and controls individuals
according to the “principle of Self.” A titan in the poem, Prometheus is a poetic representative of
the best and worst in human potential; an image of human perfection Prometheus is not, nor did
Shelley intend him. Narcissism, like the raven, feeds off what is already dead. We see a defeated
figure in the opening speech of the poem not because Jupiter is too strong but Prometheus too
weak; “[b]lack, wintry, dead, unmeasured,” as Prometheus names the terms of the contract to
which hate binds him(I.21). The eagle that gnaws and disgraces him in the first scene is a reminder
of the ravin in his heart.
In which ways does Shelley’s “principle of Self” threaten Jupiter, however?
I mentioned above three concepts at work in Defense of Poetry: reason, imagination and
utility, and how we might read them as abstract models for Jupiter, Prometheus and
Demogorgon. Shelley’s mythopoeia borrows from diverse use of classical mythology, offering
ready-made plots that he adapts to his purposes, the most important of which prophesizes the
outcome of Jupiter’s union with Thetis. Mercury informs Prometheus of this knowledge in act
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one: “There is a secret known / To thee and to none else of living things / Which may transfer the
scepter of wide Heaven” (371-3). Mercury tells Prometheus that knowledge of this prophecy
“perplexes the Supreme,” who will do anything to avoid it; Jupiter, in fact, marries Thetis to
Peleus, a mortal, to ensure their offspring poses no threat to his authority. Not Achilles, however
(son of Thetis and Peleus), but Demogorgon regulates Jupiter’s fate, gorged into existence
following the rape of his mother. In Prometheus Unbound Civilization is broken beyond man’s
capacity to repair it (hence humanity’s surface removal from the poem’s action, replaced by a
greater agent of change, a Titan, Prometheus); indeed, broken perhaps beyond even divine
restoration and redemption, and only terror survives each human heart, history’s ruin.
Demogorgon is Shelley’s response to the fall of man.
To say that Jupiter’s force gorges Demogorgon into the poem’s realm, or sphere, would
do more than point to a homophonous relationship of words; it, in a like manner, forces us to
proceed from a new reading, one that suggests not only Demogorgon’s birth but also the birth of
a new realm, or sphere which names itself “Eternity” (III.ii.52). Demogorgon would seem to
represent Utility, or necessity, in Prometheus Unbound; and unsurprisingly so, for he names
himself “eternity,” and is not subject to any index of mutability. The whole structure of
Prometheus Unbound erects itself in him and from him, this “One” whom Shelley introduces and
sets above all others in the second line of the poem: “Monarch of Gods and Daemons, and all
Spirits / But One, who throng those bright and rolling Worlds” (emphasis mine). It was, I think,
Shelley’s understanding of historical development, in which what we create as “cause” signifies
nothing but a “word expressing a certain state of the human mind with regard to the manner in
which two thoughts [[things]] are apprehended to be related to each other,” which led to his
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decision to invent Demogorgon (“On Life,” 508). In addition, Shelley’s conception of history
largely has to do with “Mutability,” to which he addressed and entitled a short poem published
in 1816. The poem leaves the reader with “Nought may endure but Mutability,” except for the
strange “may” to which rises the first iamb (16). What this suggests is that for Shelley, at least,
and in Prometheus Unbound, particularly, Love and Necessity, individual and society; or, echoed
in Civilization and its Discontents, Eros and Ananke, do not exist in a causal or sequential
relationship but coexist with each other as radials issuing from an unknown center -- unknown
always. Love and Necessity are always being birthed, and always simultaneously. Jupiter’s
prophesized fate is certain, whether he could have escaped it, irrelevant; that he chooses to rape
Thetis and set in motion the prophecy is at once a procreative (Demogorgon’s birth) and
destructive (the decision is suicide) act—“Nought may endure but Mutability” (emphasis mine).
My reasoning here echoes Freud’s toward the end of Civilization and its Discontents:
The two processes of individual and cultural development must stand in
hostile opposition to each other and mutually dispute the ground. But this
struggle between the individual and society is not a derivative of the
contradiction—probably an irreconcilable one—between the primal
instincts of Eros and death. (106)
Freud asserts that the struggle derives from “within the economics of the libido,” and represents a
dispute that “does admit of eventual accommodation in the individual,” and he then expresses the
same wish for civilization (106).
I mention this to suggest that the symptoms and conflicts of culture and the public sphere
are, at bottom, symptoms and conflicts of the psyche, the individual mind. The social customs
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for which Shelley professed so much contempt (Religion, Monarchy and Nationalism) inscribe
themselves in the ego as obstructions to individual happiness. This is because they arise in the
ego. Although the professional reader may, and should, make explicit the possible
metaphorizations within reach of Prometheus in the poem, ranging from a representative of ideal
man to ideal culture, Shelley still invests the dream of universal love of mankind in a single figure.
Nor do I take this small point to be an outcome of the textual genesis of the title, in adherence to
Aeschylus’s classical Promethean trilogy, but an illustration of the poem’s intended design. In
showing his audience a titan, Shelley tries to show them their intellectual “miniature,” their “ideal
prototype.” Nevertheless, this “ideal” psyche in whom Shelley places the redeemer’s burden
comes to resemble the much more common and conflicted one: the psyche who is already and
always in one sense a “creator” and in another a “creation” of his age.
I want to iterate the centrality of that omnipotent feeling of wholeness at which the ego
aims in its search for pleasure, happiness and perfection. The psychological imagery of the poem
works in concert with this aim, as Shelley tells us in the preface, emphasizing the human mind as
the scene of the drama: “The imagery I have employed will be found in many instances to have
been drawn from the human mind, or from those external actions by which they are expressed”
(207). in the poem Shelley demystifies the terror of the unfamiliar. Engaging psychological
discourses will not foster a reconciliation of Shelley’s relationship to literary history; such critical
treatments stand alongside traditional Shelleyean oppositions (as one critic puts it, “an otherworldly naïf versus an Anarco-activist”)17 and the theories to which readers attach them. I offer
an analogy of the psychological struggle Shelley stages in Prometheus Unbound to Freud’s
17
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theory of the relationship of individuals to society, not to show that Shelley is more politically
determined as a poet-“legislator” than aesthetically so, as aspirant of Adonais, or vice versa. One
does not require Freud to say that both politics and aesthetics run parallel in Shelley’s
apprehension of things, or that Shelley is more politically determined as a poet-“legislator” than
aesthetically so, as aspirant of Adonais. Nor does one require Freudian theory to make the case
that psychology performs an important role in Shelley’s poetry and prose; nor to argue
Romantic poetry’s obsession with the imagination resembles Modernity’s relationship to the
unconscious.
I want to impress upon the reader and remind the reader of what Shelley says in the
preface of Prometheus Unbound: “The imagery I have employed will be found in many instances
to have been drawn from the human mind, or from those external actions by which they are
expressed” (207). The province of poetry belongs to Psyche, and psyche to Other, so poetry is
fundamentally a pathological disturbance of the limits between ego and object, self and other,
event and history; there is one exception, however, which I’ve already cited—Love. According to
Freud and Shelley, poetry without Love is always already the taking of curses rather than the
giving of blessings; but of course it is both already always. The psychological operations from
which we apprehend our perceptions and perceive our apprehensions, ideas of history,
modernity, futurity begin and end in the mental sphere; their coherence and transmission comes
later in grammatical edifices and figures of speech, which are precisely what Prometheus, Jupiter
and Demogorgon are figures of speech, Shelley’s, Freud’s and our own.
Defining the exchange that Prometheus Unbound dramatizes, and that Freud exposes,
shows the mind in conflict with itself. Our defenses against a reality indifferent to our perpetual
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demise are limited, but our uncertainties which are boundless and exert upon us their strength in
this material unborn existence of reality. In the next chapter I explain the terror of becoming just
another thing in the world, just a momentary event, an object of historical ruin. Shelley answers
the absurdity of this fear in Prometheus Unbound, a vision born from chaos. Freud passes it
along to our contemporaneity and we foolishly call him a psychologist when he is, quite the
contrary, one of the great poets of the twentieth century. The poem Prometheus and Freud’s
exiled annihilation from nativity abides the pieces of its ruin in order to admit and then dismiss
the procreant wish for wholeness; poetry must historicize its love, love its history.
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Chapter Two
Perchance no thought can count them—yet they pass.
—Prometheus (PU I.424)
The poem Prometheus Unbound is uncanny from its first words: Prometheus Unbound,
A Lyrical Drama in Four Acts. Freud defines this term in the eponymous essay, The Uncanny,
ascribing it special status as an obscure species of Aesthetics. He writes:
If psychoanalytic theory is right in asserting that every affect arising form an
emotional impulse—whatever—is converted into fear by being repressed, it
follows that among those things that are felt to be frightening there must be one
group in which it can be shown that the frightening element is something that has
been repressed and now returns. This species of the frightening would then
constitute the uncanny, and it would be immaterial whether it was itself originally
frightening or arose from another affect. In the second place, if this really is the
secret nature of the uncanny, we can understand why German usage allows the
familiar (das Heimliche, the ‘homely’) to switch to its opposite, the uncanny”
(147).
Freud the modern Philosopher is to my understanding the best way to read him, the way which
best delivers his theoretical project, and does not solicit the double bind of proceeding from the
proposition that Freud is the “Father of Psycho-analytic interpretation,” wherein we as readers
become another iteration of infantile helplessness, and our turn back to Freud, a substitutive
satisfaction of paternal protection. The phrase comes from the first page of Freud’s The
Uncanny: “Yet one may presume that there exists a specific affective nucleus, which justifies the
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use of a special conceptual term.” The idea of an Affective nucleus exercises the Platonic,
Lucretian and Goethean influence in Freud. One also finds an atomic motif in Shelley, and though
the process by which Shelley’s amateurish scientific intent often extends its compass is
thoroughly and lightly documented by Richard Holmes in the seminal 1976 literary biography,
Shelley: The Pursuit, the occasional atomic phraseology Shelley turns in his poetry to stress
parallel, though imaginative, processes in the poet’s mind is not produced by similarly intense
Philosopher-Poet influences. Even so, Shelley draws from Plato, Lucretius and Goethe more
explicitly than Freud does. One concern of aesthetics is, as Freud notes, everything “beautiful,
attractive and sublime”; more profoundly, and negatively, however, is the “dread and horror,” the
psyche’s “core” fear to which aesthetics seeks access. But the “uncanny” is familiar; it is home
to us, so how is it possible for a mind to alienate itself from the very place to which it
unintentionally is always returning? As I will show, Freud and Shelley arrive at the same problem
and solution.
For a moment, I return to Shelley’s epigraph situated after the title and before the preface.
Shelley carries himself, culture and us across the great design initiated by the Greek Tragedians,
Aeschylus, particularly. Shelley’s audience for this play is, bluntly and aptly, a ghost, one with
many selves and masques, some material, others only imaginary. The epigraph, “[d]o you hear
me, Amphiarus, hidden away under the earth,” is not only a rhetorical question but also a literal
one (emphasis mine). A footnote to Norton’s second edition of Shelley’s Poetry and Prose
explains that the origin of this question lies in Cicero’s translation of a lost play by Aeschylus,
Epigoni, who voiced it through Cleanthes’s address to Zeno as a bitter interrogative of the
pleasure-seeking Dionysian lifestyle (206). So already this epigraph bears witness—hears—an
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anticipation of Freud’s “Eternal City,” one that is both inside and out of language, which
maintains the impossibility of matching historical sequence in mental images; the idea is selfevident, yes, but worth mention because Shelley will never be Aeschylus, nor Prometheus
Unbound an Attic drama. Yet also worth mentioning is that Shelley revives Aeschylus and Greek
tragedy, so the case must also be made that what is so disturbing and perverse about this
Prometheus is that we hear ourselves calling to Shelley buried beneath and hidden in the earth
(the ocean, literally), as Prometheus does Demogorgon in the poem.
Yet if we read Freud sedulously, then we see he has already built into his assumptions
and premises of memory, and what always was, an access and exit to the problem he posits in
understanding how the primitive occupies the modern simultaneously in the preservation of the
mental life of mankind: Imagination. I mentioned above Freud’s comparison of ancient to Modern
Rome, but before the reader grants Freud permission to follow this line of reasoning, which
reveals the entanglements and anxieties of the mind’s psychological preservation of memories,
and the uncanny impressions and experiences this preservation excites, he first gains access to a
key component, the only one, in my estimation, in order to demonstrate what repeatedly defeats
such entanglements and anxieties—Imagination.18
Freud prefaces, like Shelley does in Prometheus Unbound, his fundamental point with an
elitist and rarified documentation of what the “best” history is, and this complex interstice of
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Freud says in the long essay, The Uncanny, that its effects are produced by an
encounter with our “double,” and that at first this other self was a defense against the
annihilation of the body once its vital needs could no longer be met or satisfied. He
explains: “having once been an assurance of immortality, it [Doppelgänger] becomes the
uncanny harbinger of death (142).
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events, experiences and interpretations depend on the imaginative, though not pathological,
celerity of the individual. The scaffolding and flying buttresses of Freud’s thought are levied on a
contradiction of stained glass, literally and rhetorically. He comes close to saying outright that his
major assumption put forth in Civilization and its Discontents falls apart like the ruins
figuratively construing it. Freud contends:
Since we overcame the error of supposing that the forgetting we are
familiar with signified a destruction of the memory-trace—that is, its
annihilation—we have been inclined to take the opposite view, that in
mental life nothing which has once been formed can perish—that
everything is somehow preserved and that in suitable circumstances
(when, for instance, regression goes back far enough [say three thousand
years, for instance]) it can once more be brought to light. (16-7)
Supposing an inherent truth to this claim, we need only switch scientific principles with
psychological ones, since what Freud does in the abovementioned passage is to define a natural
law of physics. It is understood by science that the 1st Law of Thermodynamics states that
matter, the thingness of ourselves Freud defends against annihilation, can be neither created nor
destroyed but only transisted and transformed. One sees this displayed in Freud’s view of
Religious doctrines and beliefs, an absurd infantilization that assures perpetual infancy by
admitting a superior patriarchal figure, Aton, Moses, Christ, Jahve, Allah, Demogorgon, etc.
Shelley shares Freud’s assessment of religion but cannot seem to discard the notion of a
Universal Oneness; but really it is us as poor readers of Shelley who do not listen when he tells
us in the Defense that Oneness is simply the condition of battle and mark of faith of an
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enlightened individual who exalts the many over the one.
A similar instance of the inanity that blooms from each generation of critics to the next is
present in the opening sentence of Civilization and its Discontents, in which Freud tells us, “It is
impossible to escape the impression that people commonly use false standards of measurement
[…]” (10). This is an ironic claim for several reasons, least of which is the fact that Freud’s
measurements are anything but common; 2) escaping the “impossible” is what Religion, and
Freud (though he uses “error” instead of sin, tells us is possible; 3) the term “common” is so
relative that after reading Freud’s tome, one begins to believe that there exists only the common
alongside the singularity of Freud. Shelley of course employs a similar rhetorical trick when he
writes in the preface to Prometheus Unbound, “[d]idactic poetry is my abhorrence,” his stated
purpose is to “familiarize the highly refined imagination of the more select classes of poetical
readers with beautiful idealisms of moral excellence” (209). I want to iterate the intangible quality
of “highly refined imagination” and the physical notion of what is to us “familiar,” not because
Shelley and Freud’s thoughts are identical, but they are distributed across their texts similarly.
That Shelley wishes to “familiarize” a select audience would seem counterintuitive
alongside Wordsworth’s ardent request to bring poetry from the ethereal sphere, to the common
tongue of common man and common speech, back to iambic pentameter. But even Wordsworth is
not literally pleading for this; like Wordsworth, and Freud after him, who seek in a “common”
tongue a natural man, one uninhibited by the demands of culture and punishment of Law, Shelley
makes of his poem a document that shows us what we are not, so that his s/elect readers are
addressed not as possessors of intellectual and spiritual acumen; but its opposite, an ordinary,
terrified and therefore blood-bespackled by the ideas which have carried them to this point in
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history. The most carefully crafted bitterent Freud offers the common man indicated also a
craftsman-like exaltation of him: “Let us return to the common man and to his religion—the only
religion that ought to bear that name” (23). The “common” man, superannuated and primitive,
perhaps simply ungoverned by Law and conscience is common because of his religion and also in
spite of it. Freud says in this passage that there exists a relational dependency between the
common and religious because we at first draw out from the statement that religion is an attribute
of natural rather than civil man, but Freud criticizes both.
As Freud reiterates, there exists an inverse relationship with the Promethean tools of
scientific progress and the gradation of agitation and violence such tools bring forth into a
civilized culture. Shelley, scientific dilettante19 he was, recognized this happening in his own
country from Italy in 1820, and suggests through Prometheus Unbound a possibility of balancing
this scale, if not wholly counteracting it—Imagination.
And here we turn back again to how Freud sets up the Eternal City metaphor. He says:
Now let us, by a flight of imagination, suppose Rome is not a human
habitation but a psychical entity with similarly long and copious past—an entity,
that is to say, in which nothing that has once come into existence will pass away
and all the earlier stages of development continue to exist alongside the latest one.
(18; emphasis mine)
Again, the burden falls on the imagination to complete seemingly impossible tasks, to render
pictorially, and, according to Shelley’s definition of poet, grammatically in language or image the
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Read Richard Holmes Literary biography, Shelley: The Pursuit.
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mental life of our minds. Still more mark how Freud suggests the “flight” of imagination, which
posits an undecidable distinction between soaring like a bird or escaping like a coward. Such a
distinction calls attention to the fight/flight mechanism of language in general, but that we see
Prometheus bound to an “eagle-baffling” mountain in the first scene, since he is literally
disemboweled repeatedly by birds, suggests something more sinister at work. Prometheus is a
carcass for all physical purposes, food for ravens and other scavengers,20 a psychically raped
cannibal indebted to his own curse on Jupiter.
This brings my essay toward an understanding of this supposed embodied idea of moral
excellence, Prometheus, against and for which he struggles, succeeds and fails. I find that
Prometheus casts an implicit shadow on the rest of Shelley’s poem, Prometheus, and poetry,
meriting an accurate and exact reflection of Shelley’s philosophic and poetic ideals. This would be
one way to read the poem Prometheus Unbound, yet there is another far more tempting and
interesting. From this line of reasoning I proceed. First, Prometheus Unbound is high tragedy. In
addition, its tragic hero is Demogorgon. In sum, because the history the poem is always trying to
iterate through moments of psychological distress, the reader of it can only conjure events, single
occurrences, rather than singular knowledge of truth. The psychical pressure that these fractures
bring about in both reader and Prometheus, alongside interpretive efforts driving toward
understanding the poem as a coherent whole, fractures critical attempts to individuate them
spatially or temporally. This is to say, there is no reality in Prometheus Unbound, nor any literal
signpost or rhetorical theory we can point to in order to measure its moments and match our
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Scavengers, which include literary critics and unkind readers also, as Shelley’s initial
understanding of Keats’s death suggests.
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expectations. Shelley writes a purely imaginative document, unfiltered, employing primal
impulses alone, ones that would actually, along this line of reasoning, deteriorate when published.
That we do not hear Shelley today, Prometheus Unbound is not regularly read in English
departments demonstrates its truly uncanny nature because the author we thought we knew,
knows us so much better.
I said earlier I would look closer at Mercury’s speech addressed to Prometheus in act I.21
I also said that when we add the six lines which follow Mercury’s speech, we begin to isolate out
of the poem an inimitable sonnet, which operates in terms of an intentional deceit? by Shelley
regarding action and thought of the principle players also. For convenience and clarity, I quote
the passage a second time, this time all fourteen lines:
MERCURY.

Yet pause, and plunge

Into Eternity, where recorded time,
Even all that we imagine, age on age,
Seems but a point, and the reluctant mind
Flags wearily in its unending flight
Till it sink, dizzy, blind, lost, shelterless;
Perchance it has not numbered the slow years
Which thou [Prometheus] must spend in torture, unreprieved.

PROMETHEUS. Perchance no thought can count them—yet they pass.
MERCURY. If thou might’st dwell among the Gods the while
21

See page 5 of my thesis.
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Lapped in voluptuous joy?—

PROMETHEUS. I would not quit
This bleak ravine, these unrepentant pains.

MERCURY.Alas! I wonder at, yet pity thee. (I.17-29)
I take this passage as dramatic irony on a macrocosmic level; macrocosmic because the Eternal
and Infinite are reduced to a “point.” But to fully comprehend the sardonic sphere which Shelley
adopts in this exchange, one must turn again back to the epigraph to the preface of Prometheus,
one must hear it howling beneath the text, “[d]o you hear this, Amphiarus, hidden away under
the earth?” Remember the footnote to this epigraph that the editors of the Norton provide is that
Shelley is doing what Aeschylus does: he is parodying the Dionysus lifestyle, the inability of a
culture to not only see but prepare for the future, a culture that will not abide its own ruins, will
not stoically submit to suffering.
What else is Mercury’s question, “If thou might’st dwell among the Gods the while /
Lapped in voluptuous joy,” but another way of asking, will you live, Prometheus, as do Gods, all
pleasure, whimsy, indifferent, self-cannibalized by hate and rancor? So now we can read the
epigraph not only as an ego-maniacal (and manacled) announcement of genius, one that
transcends the Greek tragedians’s accomplishments even, but also a haunting taunt of what the
Greek’s valued above all else: balance, equipoise, stoicism, Apollonian ethics, basically. Shelley is
calling this way of merging with the cosmos utterly foolish and impossible, in such a way that
the epigraph actually overhears itself burying Aeschylus while also sending him soaring into
snow burning peeks of the Indian Caucasus, all resolve endlessly torn and flayed by winged42

carrions.
Of course, Shelley is doing something else echoing the epigraph in Prometheus’s exchange
with Mercury. He calls his “hero,” Prometheus, an impossible fool for stoically suffering threethousand years of physical torture at the decree of an infantile, though patriarchal Monarch,
Jupiter; yet Prometheus is just as childish and irrational in his unwillingness to recall his curse
and be the savior of mankind, but if this is so, then why?
I think Shelley is pointing out to us that Prometheus in his conception is not a “beautiful
idealism of moral excellence,” but quite the contrary. The uncanny effect this difference of the
idea of Prometheus produces relies on the difficulty of naming literal from rhetorical. Paul de
Man tells us that for Shelley’s last poem, The Triumph of Life, this difficulty creates for readers
certain deafness, but de Man’s admonition applies equally to Prometheus Unbound:
The Triumph of Life warns that nothing, whether deed, word, thought, or text,
ever happens in relation, positive or negative, to anything that precedes, follows,
or exists elsewhere, but only as a random event, whose power, like the power of
death, is due to the randomness of its occurrence.22 (122)
So the power of chance, which for Freud is the superior power of fate, drives all relational
connections we make, whether in the name of psyche, history or the aesthetic. Poetry then,
Shelley’s Prometheus and Prometheus certainly, is an impotent figure, and our expectations for
the Titan and author always unmatched because an expectation is another name for the eventual
realization of relational connections.
Intentionality also becomes a relational illusion in de Man’s understanding of Shelley and
22
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Romanticism. One proposition of this thesis is the question of intentionally, the apparent
disjunction between what is heard and read, said and meant, irony and reference. “I would feign
be / What it is my destiny to be” is the line that carries the whole first act, and Prometheus as a
model/anti-model and idea. Absolutely irrelevant what Prometheus’s destiny literally is, he ends
up with Asia, which some characterize as pure Love, but which I contend is simply an extension
of Prometheus, his anima other. Confined to a cave-like dwelling fit for aesthetes only, taking
upon himself the mystery not of things but their transformation into beautiful things,
independent of the subject of his liberation, mankind. The transformation Shelley acquires
throughout the poem for Prometheus is astonishing. Consider that at its opening Prometheus is
bounded to the E/earth and ends up descending its remotest depths with Asia in order to enact
Demogorgon. While this conclusion shows Prometheus absolutely free, each air-born thought a
blessing rather than curse conceived by the mind to spark the Promethean fire into the very
remotest depths of humanity’s intellect, to satisfy every flash of his and our minds, yet reluctant
to engage the revolution he apparently undergoes on humanity’s behalf.
However, though the literal fate of Prometheus might be out of his hands, that Shelley
chooses “feign” to try and put it there for his and the sake of his readers, encompasses what
Freud says is beyond (yet) the grasp of “modern” science and philosophy. That is, holding
during the same temporal event two contrary ideas, historical polarities and the bi-polarity of
mental life, in general. The homophonous correlation, and therefore annihilation of reading “fain,”
which denotes will and intentionality, as “feign,” which denotes deception and pretence, pulls
from Prometheus’s hands control of the poem. Shelley realizes this and so invents Demogorgon,
who and what is no invention at all, but the very source of the fractal nature of will and intention.
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For Shelley, Prometheus’s intention at times evidences a misguided model of action and
thought, stemming from his own psychical history between himself and father; for reader, a
model of human progress and culture, and therefore not very interesting, like any model of
perfection always is. Mercury tells us in his speech that only with great “reluctance” does the
mind “pause, and plunge / Into Eternity,” as if in assurance against history and psyche’s birth of
it. “Reluctance” implies doubt, uncertainty and fear at bottom, but Prometheus does know that
this is the natural way of things, that men and the ideas men produce are always passing by
whether men understand only the literal, rhetorical or both; Prometheus is untraumatized because
his reluctant mind is “unrepentant,” living in an always already to be uncertain future.
This dissociation between the literal and rhetorical is captured toward the end of the first
act. Having passed through his dark night of the soul, Prometheus delivers an agitated but
impassioned speech, one that thematically unites the next three acts. He despairs indifferently
and yet intellectually at his position, one occupied some two hundred years earlier by
Shakespeare’s hero, Posthumous, of the late romance, Cymbeline. I quote this passage from
Prometheus Unbound in its entirety because I judge, to a large degree, the thematic coherence and
incoherence of the poem’s last three acts upon the foundation this monologue lays:
How fair these air-born shapes! and yet I feel
Most vain all hope but love, and thou art far,
Asia! Who when my being overflowed
Wert like a golden chalice to bright wine
Which else had sunk into the thirsty dust.
All things are still—alas! how heavily
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This quiet morning weighs upon my heart;
Though I should dream, I could even sleep with grief
If slumber were denied not…I would fain
Be what it is my destiny to be,
The saviour and the strength of mankind
Or sink into the original gulph of things…
There is no agony and no solace left;
Earth can conslole, Heaven can torment no more. (I.807-20)
The first line, “[h]ow fair these air-born shapes,” is in response to Panthea’s observation
that “[o]nly a sense / Remains of them […],” but the two puns are clear: one hears air-born and
heir-born, sense and sins simultaneously, whether we choose to attribute meaning to one or the
other is irrelevant; that Shelley’s language is elastic, fluid and dynamic is key. The moderation of
these two, there are dozens, calls attention to the violent and hostile transculturation happening
at this time in England (Shelley, again, composed Prometheus Unbound in Italy) and the
continent. Because Shelley viewed the French Revolution as a clash between the superannuated
aristocracy and progressive bourgeois, one understands why heir and sins correlate. The French
and English nobles, while “civil,” were too natural and vulgar in their ethical judgments on
religious affairs. While the merchant-class bourgeois maintained a deep fidelity to the Church,
their civility and scientific sophistication questionable (note that Percy Shelley was once and
already, and probably always, in many ways Lord Percy Bysshe Shelley, and his life became a
renunciation of the indefinite article each title of nobility signifies).
It should be noted that Demogorgon is a polemical idea and figure in Shelleyean
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scholarship. Fate, Destiny, Law, Necessity, even the Dialectic itself is attributed to him. Called
many names, I prefer the one he gives himself, Eternity. And rather than iconoclastically trying
to subvert all previous critical attempts to define this indefinite article, Demogorgon, I
demonstrate how all are correct and in some way betray our desire for a Father’s protection.
From not only external threats but what Freud calls “universal love of mankind,” an “oceanic”
and sublime glimpse of something lost, denied and rebuked, but also from the agitation and
intense anxiety stemming from will transcending reason, intent compass, are we safe in
Demogoron’s sphere. Demogorgon is History, history and Psyche, or chaos, for short. I conclude
this thesis with a discussion of Demogorgon and Freud’s discussion of Moses and monotheism,
so for now, I need only make the claim that Demogorgon is the heard hero of the poem. The
point which we return to now because of its uncanny effect, owns something terrifying in its
target. An agent of order materializing from chaos riding an Ezekial chariot, Demogorgon cycles
the psychical history of Shelley’s mind in Prometheus’s composition and all of Shelley’s
compositions. That Prometheus and Prometheus is both semantic and semiotic, poem, Titan and
fable of Titan, grammatically renders him untenable (in 1820 and 2009) as an object of aesthetic
appreciation, of what a perfect man might be, do, say and think. I would think this man more
“gorgon” than “demos,” perhaps a monster for the people instead of and by them.
Yet still this is not the full story of Prometheus in his eponomial unbinding, still less of
the complex interregnum of literal and rhetorical one finds in the above-quoted speech, which
again construes itself as sonnet at fourteen lines, that aporia of hope and despair in which
Prometheus, and Shelley, no doubt, finds himself limited and micro-scoped—Love. “Most vain
all hope but love, and thou art far […],” Prometheus says, assigning love, or so it seems, a
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tributary position to hope, but love is “thou,” and “art” distant; in other words, Prometheus
quietly submits to fate and becomes a tertiary presence behind Demogorgon and Shelley.
Prometheus, that is, equates the subject of Art, reified in Thou to the eternal other, the non-self
or Freudian double. Love is not the anima Asia in this poem, but Art, which is culture, which is
tradition, civilization, which, as Freud convincingly argues, is our modern anxiety and discontent.
As long as History parades itself as sequential narrative in space, as a literal parade, a triumph
rather than infinite singularities which are never rendered whole, but which seekers, in-questers,
maybe, then art will possess not even the merciful of all destinies, a quiet and quick death, but
gets filtered through the psyches of those who wield it for individual history; Jupiter is a prime
example of this, a law-giver who is bound by Law, attached to a physical as Prometheus is
mental rock. Freud says something in The Uncanny that sheds light on this linguistic paradox,
that Northrop Frye termed “overhearing,” the highest possible eventuality of self-criticsim:
Yet it is not only this content—[superannuated primordial narcissism of which
Prometheus owns a great deal]—which is objectionable to self-criticism that can
be embodied in the figure of the double: in addition there are all the possibilities
which had they been realized, might have shaped our destiny, and to which our
imagination still clings, all the strivings of the ego that were frustrated by adverse
circumstances, all the suppressed acts of volition that fostered the illusion of free
will. (143)
This passage is heard often but not read, simply because it brings about in our psyches a
disturbing trinity of “learnt repose,” which we do not learn but guess at and pretend to own: selfcriticism, imagination and free will (II.5). I do not believe that Freud privileges as “truth”
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necessity or determinism over free will and liberty, but how I do not believe this is simple: the
first line of Civilization and its Discontents, once again, is “It is impossible to escape the
impression that people commonly use false standards of measurement.” We read this, but what
does not follow is this: there is a correct standard of measurement and you, reader, are about to
see me explain and demonstrate it. Of course I don’t attribute any special truth to Freud, no more
so than I would any other seminal author of modernism, or romanticism, for that matter. But
what is true is that Freud always employs his imagination to choose to believe the fictional world
from which his visions of the psyche prophesize themselves in reality, and, greater still, such a
vision claims as its driving force Eros, the life-drive, which for Freud was truth driven inward
toward the depth of psyche. This raises the questions whether it is necessary for psychological
health to believe in fictitious things, whether things that do not exist in our reality, like the
events, figures and speeches of Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound, or an omniscient and retributive
father figure called God, are essential ingredients in understanding and measuring the things that
do impact us. Perhaps, however, this is more a question of linguistics, definition, grammar:
realities and fictions are thus and so because we define them thus and so with so many or few
words.

49

Conclusions
I have no qualms in saying that men have always known […] that once upon a time they had a
primeval father and killed him.
—Freud (Moses and Monotheism. 1939)
I began this thesis talking about hearing and reading, rebellion and imagination, ruin and
preservation; now I will talk about murder, and demonstrate through Freud and Shelley how
original sin is nothing but psychological and grammatical murder. In 1939, Freud’s Moses and
Monotheism was published and other tremendous, though not cataclysmic transpired. The date
may seem uncanny, but it’s only familiar; if people read it or heard it otherwise, then maybe I
would not be discussing it now. Feud’s thesis in this book is that Moses, the Law-giver of
Judaism, was, in fact, not Jewish but a noble Egyptian of the Pharaoh’s court around 1350bc.
Centuries later, when the Jewish people were prepared to remember and be influenced by Moses
as a great individual, who delivered and sustained through memory the “One God Only” religious
system, primeval Father of the Jewish people, several events, according to Freud, transpired at
the same time:
The [Jews] people met with hard times; the hopes based on the favour of God
were slow in being fulfilled; it became not easy to adhere to the illusion, cherished
above all else, that they were God’s chosen people. If they wished to keep
happiness, then the consciousness of guilt [that they killed God, and were now
acknowledging it through the return of the repressed cultural memories] that they
themselves were such sinners offered a welcome excuse for God’s severity. (173)
Such is Freud’s proposition, but how does one get to Shelley’s poem through Freud? I think the
answer is that I do not. A chiasmic dependence on reading Freud through Shelley’s Prometheus
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Unbound and hearing Prometheus Unbound through Freud accomplishes two aims of literary
history: first, the text is always task; second, forget the text because once you read it, it is no
longer a text, it is history.
Literary history is all text, and of course much more than text. Before history becomes the
material happening of text, it is psychic, immaterial, yet as soon as deeds becomes words, which
are then internalized back into the psyche through reading, something is lost. This something is
characterized by its presence, immediacy, homology and synchronicity. It could be called chance,
but it could also be called allegory. The relationship between words and deeds is allegorized in the
relationship between self and civilization, and vise versa. Another way of saying this is the
relationship between Psyche and History is allegorized in the relationship between Shelley and
Freud, and vise versa. The main point of these relationships and oppositions is the question of
relation. What allegories do is impose relations by seeming to discover them. This is why Shelley
introduces Demogorgon into Prometheus Unbound. To recall Paul de Man, Demogorgon is the
trope of the name zero:
It is as sign that language is capable of engendering the principles of infinity, of
genus, species, and homogeneity, which allow for synecdochal totalizations, but
none of these tropes could come about without the systemic effacement of the
zero and its reconversion into a name. There can be no one without zero, but the
zero always appears in the guise of a one, of a (some)thing. The name is the trope
of the zero. The zero is always called a one, when zero is actually nameless,
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“innommable.”23 (59)
Demogorgon is something of a logarithm, a word and number. Shelley tells us in the preface to
Prometheus that his goal is greater than to merely reconcile the oppressor with the oppressed of
humankind. Demogorgon makes possible in the poem this transcendence of language in the guise
of its absence. Remember, Demogorgon tells us to demand no dire name.
It is often noted that Prometheus never meets Demogorgon or addresses him. Asia alone
divines his council. Because Asia is understood to be pure Love, it makes sense, critics believe, to
match this Love with Necessity. But I posit a different interpretation. Prometheus’s guilt spikes
to such a level in the first act that he traumatizes himself out of his author’s drama. When one
reads the first few speeches of Prometheus’s, intersticed with Greek-like choruses and spirits,
one gathers that Prometheus, whose will is infinite and unconquerable, nevertheless cannot
remember what he said to Jupiter. It would be extraordinarily naïve to assume that Prometheus’s
despair is caused by a memory dosed with three thousand years of torture, for if this is the case,
then others in the play would suffer the same amnesia. Yet there is something special about how
and what Prometheus remembers, that makes a great impression on the reader and affects an
uncanny sense: the Phantasm of Jupiter. Prometheus remembers his curse/course because Shelley
has the Phantasm of Jupiter repeat it to him. The curse reads like a homily or prayer, and it
should because Prometheus is listening to the words in obeisance:
O’er all things but thyself I gave thee power,
And my own Will.
--------------------------------I curse thee! Let a sufferer’s curse
23
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Clasp thee, his torturer, like remorse,
Till think Infinity shall be
A robe of envenomed agony;
And thine Omnipotence a crown of pain
To cling like burning gold round thy dissolving brain.
-----------------------------Both infinite as is the Universe,
And thou, and thy self-torturing solitude.
An awful image of calm power
Though now thou sittest, let the hour
Come, when thou must appear to be
That which thou art internally. (I.273-99)
Through this curse, the poem undergoes many changes, textual and thematic. On the
surface, we see Prometheus developing cognitively and emotionally, but his brain is “dissolving,”
and to explain this attribute of the poetic mind, one must turn again to levels and ways or reading
the word “dissolving.” Jupiter later dissolves when Demogorgon ascends to his ethereal throne,
destroys his power over Earth, Prometheus and humanity, and so too Demogorgon, when he
descends back to the depths. Moses, we can say, according to Freud’s argument, dissolves also,
until that time when the vital needs of the Jewish people are not being met, and his dissolution is
based on mass guilt based on the severity of God’s judgments; then he reappears as a forgotten
memory and is caged once more, like Demogorgon, until the One God Only need be resurrected
again.
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If we focus on the word “dissolve,” we begin to see inside of it “solve,” “soul,” “sole,”
“dis,” “evolve,” even “love,” etc. Again, this is an exemplary instance of the literal trapped in the
rhetorical, or visa versa. What we read is the pejorative dissolve; we do not hear its contrary,
coalesce, because this is the word Shelley knows we desire, but for a poet such as Shelley, it is a
far greater intellectual accomplishment for the brain to dissolve like sand, to (as its etymology
suggests, come apart toward pluralism) than incorporate into the bondage of One. But there is
another, more focused and intentional ambivalency in the Phantasm’s speech, far beyond the
sphere of even the question of the indefinite article “phantasm,” and which leads me into the
discussion of Moses and Demogorgon, or at the macrocosmic level, Freud and Shelley, Psyche
and History:
[L]et the hour
Come, when thou must appear to be
That which thou art internally.
These three lines merit close attention if only because they propose that appearance and the
interpretation of appearance are linked by this word “art.” The binary carries further appearance
and reality to external and internal, and only one figure in Prometheus Unbound owns completely
the internal, depths, gulph of things, Demogorgon.
One gets the sense that there is something always moiling and seething, like a volcano, to
be sure, but unlike a mountain peak, unlike Prometheus. The volcanization of Demogorgon is
forecasted in the second line of the poem, “[a]ll spirits but One [Demogorgon],” and his home
more potent than the mountain because of its destructive, terrifying and chaotic nature. If a
mountain were to symbolize our unconscious minds, then a volcano would symbolize both our
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unconscious and conscious minds. Demogorgon is the monotheistic access to Prometheus
Unbound, like Moses is the pure monotheistic force, as a great man, to Moses and Monotheism.
Shelley’s monism, I propose, masques as Manichaeism in a similar correlative of
Judaism’s pure monotheism to Christianity’s Trinitarian doctrine, which by definition alone can
never be monotheistic. Shelley makes this point setting up his own fictive players, Demogorgon,
Jupiter and Prometheus; Asia, conceivably, could be substituted for anyone of these since her
power is Love, an attribute or absence in all three. This relationship lets me say that Demogorgon
is the literally and rhetorical hero of Prometheus Unbound, and Asia’s descent to Demogorgon’s
cave is a descent into the remote corner of what Freud calls the super-ego, conscience, internal
Law. But I think it goes still further than Freud’s terminology, or is a more accurate wording of it,
at least, because in Demogorgon’s case there is not submission whatsoever to external law or
reality—Demogorgon reigns supreme in this imaginary world while at once stimulating its
transculturalization. Each evocation of Demogorgon in order to reinscribe psychical/cyclical
history is an announcement of the failure of society to meet the needs of individuals; each
centrality, announces the end of an event and its beginning.
The echoes presage exactly this chiasmic relationship, which Demogorgon embodies:
In the world unknown
Sleeps a voice unspoken;
By thy step alone
Can its rest be broken,
Child of Ocean! (II.189-94)
The chorus is well aware of what Demogorgon is and even alludes to the first literal murder of
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genesis, in which “Cain,” or “Can” kills Abel. True poets, Shelley suggests speak an unspoken
language, and literary critics, historians, scientists and philosophers must overhear it in order to
move beyond logo and ego centrism; yet the central point of this passage tells us that “step” is
key. I read the line, “By thy step alone,” as something like we must be near in proximity to
poets, great men, even such as contrary thinkers Shelley and Moses, that by this “step” we raise
ourselves, and raze simultaneously to rest, death. A step is only an action, a movement toward a
value of greater resolve, peace and rest; it is abrupt and cyclical, so perhaps we are not ready to
read Shelley’s step yet, perhaps this is why we do not hear him.
To return to Asia’s interrogation of Demogorgon, which begins by Demogorgon’s
interrogation of her when he asks of her, “Ask what thou wouldst know” (II.iii.7), I quote only
Demogorgon’s words, not Asia’s, knowing full well their meanings interrelate and hinge on being
read together, but for Freud’s sake, and Moses’s, I choose to hear only Demogorgon’s:
DEMOGORGON. Ask what thou would’st know.
-----------------------------DEMOGORGON. All things thou dar’st demand
-----------------------------DEMOGORGON. God.
-----------------------------DEMOGORGON. God, Almighty God.
-----------------------------DEMOGORGON. Merciful God.
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DEMOGORGON. He reigns.
-----------------------------DEMOGORGON. He reigns.
This is the sum of all Demogorgon says until in act three Jupiter, sitting on his throne, asks,
“Awful Shape, what art thou? Speak!” and Demogorgon replies, “Eternity—demand no direr
name […],” (50-1) but the sum of his words places on scholarship an unbearable onus,” because
we can only understand these characters, these alphabetic symbols even, as literal parts of a
rhetorical whole; so that what we see when we quote only what we choose to quote is aporias
and lacunae, the “[s]corn[ed] track thy lagging fall through boundless space and time” (I.301).
Reading between the lines in Prometheus Unbound is a challenge, to be sure; numerous aporetic
objections exist in both poem and scholarship it solicits. Calling attention again to the “--------,”
or the lacunae that I construct, I see how perhaps reading is vision, giving a pulse to the blank
flatline inscription of a writer’s death and monument, his poetry. When we do this, fill in the
blanks, so to speak, we measure aesthetically, and therefore also politically, what Shelley calls
the track of “thy lagging fall,” which is really just a step on another tower, further in distance
from the Earth, but still bounded to it by language. This language can be merciful, as in New
Testament or almighty, as in Old. But it is imperative to read and hear the language, above all, to
see its inscription between the aporetic lacuna, the literal and rhetorical.
Of course Freud has something to say about all this in Moses and Monotheism, but he
does not use the terminology adopted by several generations of literary critics. He actually begins
Moses and Monotheism with one such, the most important one, ambivalency mentioned in the
previous paragraph: “To deny a people the man whom it praises as the greatest of its sons is not
57

a deed to be taken lightheartedly.” This is exactly what he does and he knows it; this is exactly
what the Jews do to Moses and they probably know it; finally, this is exactly what we do to
Freud and the psychologists are beginning to understand it. Freud’s opening line is further
complicated by the word “sun,” since Freud could be talking about Egyptian Sun Gods, Old
Testament prophets, the father-son dynamic in family romances, or Christ. I contend Freud does
and intends all four, but this is not important at this point in my thesis. Freud begins with a
denial and ends with this:
If we are quite clear in our minds that procedure like the present one—to take
from the traditional material what seems useful and to reject what is unsuitable,
and then to put the individual pieces together according to their psychological
probability—does not afford any security for finding the truth, then one is quite
right to ask why such an attempt was undertaken. In answer to this I must cite the
result. If we substantially reduce the sever demands usually made on a historical
and psychological investigation, then it might be possible to clear up problems that
have always seemed worthy of attention and that, in consequence of recent events,
force themselves again on our observation. (133; emphasis mine)
The “recent events” to which Freud refers is the beginning of WWII and the systematic,
mechanized, “civilized,” one abhors to say, elimination of Jews. Substitute 9/11, and the
permanent state of war it enacts between East and West, and more prophetic words exist no
where else in twentieth century thought. Freud is also demonstrating, by producing an uncanny
effect, the conclusion to his book which opens new possibilities of thinking about civilization.
I want to end with Shelley, since Prometheus Unbound got me to Freud in the first place.
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The explication of “ravin” I delivered in chapter one still resonates. The OED defines an obsolete,
perhaps uncanny definition of the word: “The sound of the cry of a raven.” Along which course
will we feed in the twenty-first century: literal, rhetorical, both? Or will we try to annihilate and
dissolve the ravin in ourselves, cannibalize all that it worthy of the idea, Love, the event History,
make from it a Psychic corpse?
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